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I. THE PROBLEM
For decades, law enforcement has used what the state of Florida
calls an "irreplaceable tool in detecting those who grow marijuana in
their living rooms; construct meth labs in their kitchens; hide bodies in
their basements; or make bombs in their garages": dogs.' Every year,
state and federal law enforcement authorities conduct thousands of dog
sniffs.2 In 2010 alone, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
used dogs to uncover over 4,700 indoor marijuana "grow sites."3
The detection of one such grow operation was the catalyst for the
Florida Supreme Court's attempt to limit the scope of dog sniffs. In
Jardines v. State, the police walked their drug-sniffing dog Franky to
* J.D. Candidate 2013, University of Miami School of Law. I would like to thank my
parents for their support, and Professor Susan Bandes for her advice.
1. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 31, Florida v. Jardines, No. 11-564 (U.S. Oct. 26, 2011),
available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Jardines-petition-final.
pdf.
2. Brief of Texas et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 2-4, Florida v. Jardines,
No. 11-564 (U.S. Dec. 5, 2011), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/
2011/12/11-564-JardinesAmicus-Briefl.pdf.
3. Id. at 3.
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Joelis Jardines's front door.4 After Franky alerted, the police got a war-
rant; their ensuing search revealed a marijuana grow operation.'
The Florida Supreme Court held that the sniff "violated the Fourth
Amendment": 6 A dog sniff of the outside of a house "is a substantial
government intrusion into the sanctity of the home and constitutes a
'search,"' thus requiring probable cause and a warrant.' The court
determined that one's reasonable expectation of privacy is most power-
ful in the home-"[t]he sanctity of the citizen's home" compels Fourth
Amendment protection from warrantless dog sniffs, whereas other, less
sacred places such as cars do not.9
Despite the Florida Supreme Court's stated desire to protect the
sanctity of the home, Jardines applies only to dog sniffs conducted
outside houses. The court did not invalidate warrantless dog sniffs con-
ducted outside other types of homes, such as apartments. In fact, the
court distinguished Stabler v. State (which held that a dog sniff con-
ducted at an apartment door was not a search)'o on the ground that an
apartment is a "temporary dwelling" not accorded the same status as a
genuine "private residence.""
The United States Supreme Court has granted Florida's petition for
a writ of certioraril 2 to decide the following question: "Whether a dog
sniff at the front door of a suspected grow house by a trained narcotics
detection dog is a Fourth Amendment search requiring probable
cause[.]"" In his brief opposing the granting of certiorari, Jardines
argued that the Florida Supreme Court's decision was correct because,
among other reasons, houses receive greater Fourth Amendment protec-
tion than other areas: "The dog sniff in this case did not take place at the
door of an apartment from a common hallway in a large apartment com-
4. Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34, 37 (Fla. 2011).
5. Id. at 37-38.
6. Id. at 56.
7. Id. at 36.
8. Id. at 37.
9. Id. at 45.
10. Stabler v. State, 990 So. 2d 1258, 1263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
11. Jardines, 73 So. 3d at 39 n.3. Similarly, in Rabb-which the Jardines court approved, id.
at 56-the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that a sniff conducted at the front door of a house
was a search. State v. Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1175, 1188 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). The court
distinguished a case upholding a dog sniff conducted at a hotel room door by arguing that a hotel
room "is neither as private nor as sacrosanct" as a house. Id. at 1186 (distinguishing Nelson v.
State, 867 So. 2d 534 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)). The court "view[ed] the reasonable expectation
of privacy afforded to locations along a hierarchy from public to private," with hotel rooms
"somewhere in between." Id.
12. Florida v. Jardines, 132 S. Ct. 995 (2012).
13. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at i.
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plex," but "at the front door of a private residence."l 4 Florida countered
that "[t]here is no difference between an apartment and a detached house
for Fourth Amendment purposes," so that neither should have Fourth
Amendment protection from warrantless dog sniffs.15
A majority of state and federal courts interprets United States
Supreme Court precedent to mean that a dog sniff is never a search.16 If
these courts are correct, then the place where the sniff occurs is irrele-
vant; neither a house nor an apartment is protected. But despite these
authorities, the Florida Supreme Court set out to protect homes from dog
sniffs. Once determined on that path, the court should not have limited
its protection just to houses; instead, it should have disapproved of Sta-
bler, and extended Fourth Amendment protection to "temporary dwell-
ing[s]"" as well.
This article will show that, contrary to the Florida Supreme Court's
distinction between them, apartments' 8 and houses are similar, so that
they should be subject to the same rule regarding warrantless dog sniffs.
The reasons that courts cite for attributing to houses a heightened expec-
tation of privacy apply equally to apartments, and the reasons given for
attributing a reduced expectation of privacy to apartments apply equally
to houses. Houses and apartments should therefore be treated the
same-either protected or not. If, like the Florida Supreme Court, one
abandons the per se rule that a dog sniff is not a search, and instead
holds that the sanctity of the home triggers the warrant requirement, then
there is no valid reason to exclude apartments from the same protection
granted to houses.
This article will further argue that the United States Supreme Court
will probably reverse the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Jardines
because prior United States Supreme Court precedent holds that a dog
sniff is not a search. However, the United States Supreme Court ought to
overrule its per se rule that a dog sniff is not a search, and instead grant
Fourth Amendment protection from warrantless dog sniffs not just to
houses (which is where the Florida Supreme Court stopped), but to
apartments as well.
14. Respondent's Amended Brief in Opposition at 24, Florida v. Jardines, No. 11-564 (U.S.
Dec. 2, 2011), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/11-564-
BIO.pdf.
15. Reply Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Florida v. Jardines, No. II-
564 (U.S. Dec. 15, 2011), 2011 WL 6417742.
16. Jardines, 73 So. 3d at 67-68 & nn.15-16 (Polston, J., dissenting) (collecting cases). The
state of Florida relied on this argument in its petition for certiorari. Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
supra note 1, at 14 ("[A] dog sniff is not a search.").
17. Jardines, 73 So. 3d at 39 n.3.
18. For the sake of brevity, I use the term "apartments" to mean dwellings in any multi-unit
structures.
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Part II of this article surveys the relevant cases, including those
concerning the reasonable expectation of privacy test, and its application
to different types of places; and the constitutionality of warrantless dog
sniffs in general, and of such dog sniffs of houses and apartments in
particular. Part III shows that in its zeal to protect the sanctity of the
home, the Jardines court misapplied United States Supreme Court pre-
cedent, but that its opinion was still defensible, given the flaws of the
United States Supreme Court's dog sniff jurisprudence, and given the
United States Supreme Court's own solicitude for the sacred home.
Lastly, Part IV first argues that Jardines should also apply to apartments
because, as homes, they engender expectations of privacy similar to
those of houses; and then describes the consequences of a contrary
approach in this era of economic depression.
.II. THE RELEVANT CASE LAW
The Fourth Amendment provides, "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause . . . ."9 A warrantless search is "presumptively
unreasonable." 2 0 But what constitutes a search? And is a dog sniff a
search?
A. Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
To determine whether official conduct is a search, modern courts
use a test devised by Justice Harlan in his concurrence in Katz v. United
States.2 1 Under this test, "there is a twofold requirement, first that a per-
son have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize
as 'reasonable.'" 2 2 The reasonableness of one's expectation of privacy
often depends on the nature of the place or object that engenders that
expectation; for example, one usually has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the home, but not in objects in plain view.23
19. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. Florida courts are bound by the United States Supreme Court's
interpretations of the Fourth Amendment. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
20. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
21. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2001) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
22. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
23. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
[Vol. 66:11331136
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1. REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS: THE HOME
The Fourth Amendment reflects "the ancient adage that a man's
house is his castle."24 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has said
on multiple occasions that the Fourth Amendment's primary purpose is
the protection of the sanctity of the home.2 5 This protection also applies
to the home's curtilage, or the area around the home "to which extends
the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man's home and
the privacies of life."26
So strong is the impulse to preserve the home's sanctity that the
Supreme Court has often extended Fourth Amendment protection to
dwellings other than houses.2 7 In McDonald v. United States, the Court
held unconstitutional a search of a room in a rooming house conducted
after police broke into the building.2 8 In his concurrence, Justice Jackson
was particularly adamant: "It is to me a shocking proposition that private
homes, even quarters in a tenement, may be indiscriminately invaded at
the discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in following up
offenses that involve no violence or threats of it." 2 9 In Miller v. United
States, the Court held unconstitutional the warrantless entry of an apart-
ment, equating an apartment with a house: "Every householder, the good
and the bad, the guilty and the innocent, is entitled to the protection
designed to secure the common interest against unlawful invasion of the
house."3 0 And in Stoner v. California, the Court likewise held unlawful
the warrantless search of the petitioner's hotel room, proclaiming, "No
less than a tenant of a house, or the occupant of a room in a boarding
house, a guest in a hotel room is entitled to constitutional protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures."
More recently, the Court expressed its solicitude for the sanctity of
the home in Kyllo v. United States, in which it determined that the use of
24. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958).
25. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) ("[T]he physical entry of the home is the
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 394 (1914) ("[Tlhe 4th Amendment was
intended to secure the citizen in person and property against unlawful invasion of the sanctity of
his home by officers of the law . . . .").
26. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) (identifying factors relevant to determining
"whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed under
the home's 'umbrella' of Fourth Amendment protection").
27. Carrie Leonetti, Open Fields in the Inner City: Application of the Curtilage Doctrine to
Urban and Suburban Areas, 15 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 297, 310 (2005) ("The Supreme Court
has afforded apartments and hotel rooms status as 'homes' under the Fourth Amendment.").
28. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 452, 456 (1948).
29. Id. at 459 (Jackson, J., concurring).
30. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 302, 313 (1958) (emphasis added).
31. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 484, 490 (1964) (emphasis added).
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a thermal imager to scan the heat emanating from a house was a
search. 3 2 The Court held, "[O]btaining by sense-enhancing technology
any information regarding the interior of the home that could not other-
wise have been obtained without physical intrusion into a constitution-
ally protected area constitutes a search-at least where (as here) the
technology in question is not in general public use."" There is a height-
ened expectation of privacy in the home, in which "all details are inti-
mate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government
eyes."34
2. UNREASONABLE EXPECTATIONS: PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE
AREAS AND CONTRABAND
In contrast to the home, areas that the public may access physically
or by sight do not engender reasonable expectations of privacy. For
example, open fields (as distinct from curtilage) do not receive Fourth
Amendment protection. One cannot have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in open fields because they "usually are accessible to the public
and the police in ways that a home, an office, or commercial structure
would not be." 36 Even the presence of a fence might not be enough to
make a field part of the curtilage if members of the public can see what
occurs in the field.3
Police do not violate the Fourth Amendment when their conduct
occurs in a place where they have a right to be. In California v. Ciraolo,
police flew over Ciraolo's house, and spotted marijuana being grown in
his yard.3 ' The Supreme Court held that this was not a search because
Ciraolo could not reasonably expect that his garden would go unob-
served. 39 Flight is routine, so "[a]ny member of the public" could have
seen the garden; the police were thus observing "from a public vantage
point where [they had] a right to be."4 0 Similarly, in California v.
Greenwood, the police found evidence of drug dealing by going through
the respondents' trash without a warrant. 4' The Court held that the
respondents had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the trash
because they left it at the curb, where it was "readily accessible to ani-
32. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29, 34-35 (2001).
33. Id. at 34 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
34. Id. at 33, 37.
35. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
36. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984).
37. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 296, 303 (1987).
38. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986).
39. Id. at 214.
40. Id. at 215, 213; accord Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450-51 (1989) (plurality opinion).
41. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37-38 (1988).
[Vol. 66:11331138
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mals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public."42
Another gap in Fourth Amendment protection is what one scholar
calls "the contraband exception," according to which there is no reason-
able expectation of privacy in contraband, so that a process that reveals
only contraband is not a search.43 For instance, in United States v.
Jacobsen, a federal agent tested a powder that turned out to be cocaine.'
The Supreme Court held that this test was not a search" because con-
duct that reveals only contraband, and not any "'private' fact, com-
promises no legitimate privacy interest."4 6
B. Dog Sniffs
The contraband exception had its roots in United States v. Place.4 7
In fact, the contraband exception was the Supreme Court's very ratio-
nale for holding that a dog sniff is not a search. In Place, agents sus-
pecting Place of drug trafficking took his luggage and subjected it to a
dog sniff; after the dog alerted, the agents obtained a search warrant, and
subsequently found cocaine in one of the bags.4 8 The Court held that the
dog sniff was not a search because "the canine sniff is sui generis"-it
does not require "expos[ing] noncontraband items" (opening the lug-
gage, for example), and it "discloses only the presence or absence of ...
contraband.""
Since Place, the Supreme Court has addressed the constitutionality
of dog sniffs of the exterior of a car. In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,
the Court determined that the dog sniff of a car stopped at a vehicle
checkpoint "does not transform the seizure into a search" because the
sniff "does not require entry into the car and is not designed to disclose
any information other than the presence or absence of narcotics." 0
Five years later, Illinois v. Caballes involved a dog sniff of a car
during a traffic stop." Relying on the contraband exception, and on
Place's characterization of the dog sniff as sui generis,5 2 the Supreme
Court held that the sniff was not a search: "A dog sniff conducted during
a concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than
42. Id. at 40-41.
43. Timothy C. MacDonnell, Orwellian Ramifications: The Contraband Exception to the
Fourth Amendment, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 299, 303 (2010).
44. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 111 (1984).
45. Id. at 124.
46. Id. at 123.
47. MacDonnell, supra note 43, at 302.
48. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 699 (1983).
49. Id. at 707.
50. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000).
51. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 406 (2005).
52. Id. at 408-09.
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the location of a substance that no individual has any right to possess
does not violate the Fourth Amendment." 53
1. DOG SNIFFS CONDUCTED AT HOUSES
A conclusive answer to the question whether a dog sniff conducted
outside of a home is a search must wait until the United States Supreme
Court decides Jardines. Nonetheless, some federal and state courts have
addressed the issue, most of them concluding that a dog sniff conducted
outside of a home is not a search.54
The few cases that hold that a dog sniff conducted outside a house
is a search often rely on Kyllo. For example, in State v. Rabb, a Florida
court held that a dog sniff conducted at the front door of a house was an
unconstitutional search.55 "Relying on Kyllo," the court argued that the
dog was "sense-enhancing technology" that law enforcement used "to
detect that which it otherwise could not detect with unaided human
senses"-"the smell of marijuana," which was "an 'intimate detail' of
that house."
But courts holding that a dog sniff conducted outside a house is not
a search refuse to make an analogy between dogs and the thermal imager
in Kyllo because the imager could also detect noncontraband, whereas
dogs supposedly cannot.57 Additionally, these courts emphasize that
sniffs conducted at the front door or other commonly accessed areas
outside a house are not searches because the police have a right to be
there. Thus, in Hoop v. State, an Indiana court held that a dog sniff at the
front door of the appellant's house was not a search because the police-
man "could lawfully approach Hoop's front door using the walkway that
would ordinary be used by any visitor."5 Under such circumstances,
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy.59
53. Id. at 410.
54. Leslie A. Lunney, Has the Fourth Amendment Gone to the Dogs?: Unreasonable
Expansion of Canine Sniff Doctrine to Include Sniffs of the Home, 88 OR. L. REv. 829, 831 & n.7
(2009). In contrast, most academic opinion concludes that a dog sniff of the outside of a home is a
search. E.g., id. at 832; Renee Swanson, Comment, Are We Safe at Home from the Prying Dog
Sniff?, 11 Loy. J. PUB. Trr. L. 131, 132 (2009).
55. State v. Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1175, 1179, 1188 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
56. Id. at 1184; accord United States v. Jackson, No. IP 03-79-CR-IH/F, 2004 WL 1784756,
at *3 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 2, 2004) ("The court sees no constitutional distinction between the use of
specially trained dogs and sophisticated electronics from outside a home to detect activities in or
contents of the home's interior.").
57. Hoop v. State, 909 N.E.2d 463, 468 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citing United States v. Brock,
417 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2005)).
58. Id.
59. United States v. Byle, No. 8:10-CR-419-T-30TGW, 2011 WL 1983355, at *3-4 (M.D.
Fla. May 20, 2011); Rodriguez v. State, 106 S.W.3d 224, 228 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003). The Byle
[Vol. 66:11331140
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2. DOG SNIFFS CONDUCTED AT APARTMENTS
Nor, according to most courts, is there a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the hallways and other common areas of apartment build-
ings. 6 0 These courts reason that a tenant lacks the right to exclude people
from such spaces, so that landlords, neighbors, visitors, mailmen, deliv-
erymen, and others may use them. 6 1 Consequently, the police may law-
fully enter common areas. 6 2 Although the apartment itself receives as
much Fourth Amendment protection as any other home, the area outside
it is (in the words of one Maryland court) "no different than a public
street or an open field," so that "[t]he police need no justification for
being there"-they could go "on the most baseless or random of fishing
expeditions and it would be beyond our area of concern." 63 Meanwhile,
only the Sixth Circuit has held that there is a reasonable expectation of
privacy in common areas-but only in cases in which the apartment
buildings have been locked, when tenants reasonably expect only tenants
and guests, but not trespassers, to enter.64
Because of the low expectation of privacy attached to common
areas, most courts uphold dog sniffs conducted at the doors of apart-
ments or similar dwellings (like hotel or motel rooms, or train sleeper
compartments).6 5 In these cases, courts emphasize the same rationales,
including the police's presence where they have a right to be,66 and the
court proceeded to criticize Jardines as wrongly decided: "[T]his Court accepts the Supreme
Court meant what it said-a dog sniff is not a search." Byle, 2011 WL 1983355, at *4.
60. United States v. Brown, 169 F.3d 89, 92 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d
1239, 1242 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Holland, 755 F.2d 253, 255 (2d Cit. 1985); United
States v. Broadway, 580 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1193 (D. Colo. 2008); United States v. Deleon-
Bayardo, No. 07-99 (JRT/SRN), 2008 WL 141761, at *3 (D. Minn. Jan. 14, 2008).
61. United States v. Cephas, 254 F.3d 488, 494 (4th Cir. 2001); Nohara, 3 F.3d at 1242;
United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir. 1991); Holland, 755 F.2d at 255-56;
United States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814, 816 (8th Cit. 1977); State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173, 179
(Minn. 2007).
62. Brown, 169 F.3d at 92; United States v. Miguel, 340 F.2d 812, 814 (2d Cir. 1965);
Deleon-Bayardo, 2008 WL 141761, at *3.
63. Fitzgerald v. State, 837 A.2d 989, 1025-1026 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003); accord United
States v. Roby, 122 F.3d 1120, 1125 (8th Cir. 1997); Concepcion, 942 F.2d at 1172; Davis, 732
N.W.2d at 179; see also Leonetti, supra note 27, at 310.
64. United States v. Heath, 259 F.3d 522, 524, 534 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Carriger,
541 F.2d 545, 547, 551, 552 (6th Cir. 1976); Sean M. Lewis, Note, The Fourth Amendment in the
Hallway: Do Tenants Have a Constitutionally Protected Privacy Interest in the Locked Common
Areas of Their Apartment Buildings?, 101 MIcH. L. REV. 273, 274, 277, 282-83 (2002).
65. Roby, 122 F.3d at 1122 (motel room); United States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d 469, 471 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (train sleeper compartment); Nelson v. State, 867 So. 2d 534, 535 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2004) (hotel room).
66. United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d 1009, 1015 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Drayton,
Criminal No. 10-20018-01-KHV, 2010 WL 4721188, at *3 (D. Kan. Nov. 15, 2010); Stabler v.
State, 990 So. 2d 1258, 1263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Kerr v. State, No. 14-02-00569, 2003 WL
21542497, at *3 (Tex. Ct. App. July 10, 2003).
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dog's ability to detect only contraband, in which there is no legitimate
expectation of privacy.67
Two cases are illustrative. In Fitzgerald v. State, the police entered
an apartment building through unlocked doors, and conducted a dog
sniff at Fitzgerald's apartment door.68 The Maryland Court of Appeals
held that the sniff was not a search because the police conducted it from
a publicly accessible hallway in which they were lawfully present.69 The
court interpreted Place as holding that a dog sniff is not a search, regard-
less of the location sniffed.o Moreover, it found Kyllo inapplicable
because "a dog is not technology-he or she is a dog."7 Likewise, in
United States v. Broadway, the District of Colorado upheld a dog sniff
done from a common hallway because another tenant permitted the
police to enter the building, making their presence lawful;7 2 and because
a dog, unlike a thermal imager, does not reveal noncontraband. 3
Even states that consider dog sniffs to be searches under their con-
stitutions permit warrantless dog sniffs if the police have reasonable sus-
picion that contraband is present.74 The source7 5 of this standard was
Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Place, in which he speculated that "a
dog sniff may be a search, but a minimally intrusive one that could be
justified . . . upon mere reasonable suspicion."7 6 Consistent with that
analysis, in apartment cases, New York," Nebraska,7 and Minnesota79
adopted a reasonable suspicion standard for dog sniffs of homes in gen-
eral, on the grounds that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in
one's home,80 but that dog sniffs are sui generis, minimally intrusive
searches capable only of detecting contraband.
Only one court has held that a dog sniff conducted outside an apart-
67. Scott, 610 F.3d at 1016; Stabler, 990 So. 2d at 1263; Kerr, 2003 WL 21542497, at *3.
68. Fitzgerald v. State, 864 A.2d 1006, 1008 (Md. 2004).
69. Id. at 1017.
70. Id. at 1012.
71. Id. at 1015.
72. United States v. Broadway, 580 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1193 (D. Colo. 2008).
73. Id. at 1191; accord United States v. Anthony, Criminal No. 11-68 (JBS), 2012
WL959448, at *4-5 (D.N.J. Mar. 20, 2012).
74. See generally Kenneth L. Pollack, Note, Stretching the Terry Doctrine to the Search for
Evidence of Crime: Canine Sniffs, State Constitutions, and the Reasonable Suspicion Standard, 47
VAND. L. REV. 803, 806 (1994) (advocating a narrowly construed reasonable suspicion standard
"to regulate certain types of minimally intrusive pure investigatory searches").
75. Fitzgerald, 864 A.2d at 1021, 1022.
76. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 723 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the
judgment).
77. People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 1055 (N.Y. 1990).
78. State v. Ortiz, 600 N.W.2d 805, 811 (Neb. 1999).
79. State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173, 181 (Minn. 2007).
80. Id. at 177; Ortiz, 600 N.W.2d at 811, 819; Dunn, 564 N.E.2d at 1058.
81. Davis, 732 N.W.2d at 180; Dunn, 564 N.E.2d at 1058.
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ment was a search requiring a warrant. In United States v. Thomas, the
DEA conducted a warrantless dog sniff outside the apartment of one of
the defendants.82 The Second Circuit held that because the defendant
had "a heightened expectation of privacy in his dwelling"-"a legiti-
mate expectation that the contents of his closed apartment would remain
private"-the dog sniff was a search in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment." In a way, the Thomas court foreshadowed Kyllo; it portrayed the
drug-sniffing dog as a form of sense-enhancement that-even though it
senses only contraband-"remains a way of detecting the contents of a
private, enclosed space," which the police could not detect with their
own senses. 8 4
But Thomas is atypical. With the exception of a few cases and law
review articles," Thomas is nearly universally criticized for suggesting
that one can still have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
contraband. 6
C. The Contours of the Dog Sniff Debate
The two sides in the dog sniff debate separate over two main issues.
The first dispute is over whether the controlling issue is the dog sniff's
sui generis nature, or the nature of the place sniffed, such as the home.
For example, dissenting in Jardines, Justice Polston argued that Kyllo
was inapplicable because "the very limited and unique type of intrusion
involved in a dog sniff is the dispositive distinction under United States
Supreme Court precedent, not whether the object sniffed is luggage, an
automobile, or a home."87 In contrast, the Rabb court argued that "[t]he
function of 'place' in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was instrumen-
tal in the decision in Place," which involved a sniff of mere luggage; the
82. United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1366 (2d Cir. 1985).
83. Id. at 1367. The use of the word "dwelling" shows that Thomas applies to dog sniffs
outside any home, not just an apartment.
84. Id.; see also Barbara Tarlow, Note, Dog Sniff Searches and United States v. Thomas: The
Second Circuit Takes a Needed Bite Out of Place, 19 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1097, 1121 (1986)
("[Tihe holding is based on the rationale that individuals have an expectation that the contents of
their homes will not be sensed by a device outside their homes." (emphasis added)).
85. State v. Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1175, 1184 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Ortiz, 600 N.W.2d at
817; Tarlow, supra note 84, at 1100.
86. United States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d 469, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1989); United States v. Broadway,
580 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1189 (D. Colo. 2008); Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1200 (Gross, J., dissenting);
Nelson v. State, 867 So. 2d 534, 536 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Hoop v. State, 909 N.E.2d 463,
467 & n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (collecting cases); Fitzgerald v. State, 864 A.2d 1006, 1016 (Md.
2004); Fitzgerald v. State, 837 A.2d 989, 1031 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003).
87. Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34, 69 (Fla. 2011) (Polston, J., dissenting); accord Stabler v.
State, 990 So. 2d 1258, 1261 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1193, 1196-97
(Gross, J., dissenting); Fitzgerald, 864 A.2d at 1010, 1012 ("[T]he location or circumstance of the
sniff [is] relevant only to determine whether the dog and officer's presence there [is]
constitutional.").
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question whether conduct is a search requires "reference to a place," and
the expectation of privacy that it creates. 8
Second, and relatedly, courts differ over whether the nature of the
object sniffed for-contraband or noncontraband-or the nature of the
place sniffed should control. The majority and dissent in Rabb sparred
over this very issue, with the majority arguing that the expectation of
privacy in the home-not in contraband-is the proper focus," and the
dissent pointing to Place and Jacobsen.90
These aspects of the dog sniff debate also appear in Jardines. The
Florida Supreme Court based its decision on "[t]he sanctity of the citi-
zen's home," in which the expectation of privacy is strongest and most
reasonable." To sidestep Place, the Jardines court argued that a dog
sniff of the exterior of a home is not sui generis because "it also consti-
tutes an intrusive procedure that may expose the resident to public
opprobrium, humiliation and embarrassment."9 2 The sniff at Jardines's
house was "a public spectacle" featuring many agents and police, who
were "in plain view of the general public" for hours, from the prepara-
tion for the sniff to the ensuing search of Jardines's house; under such
circumstances, Jardines could have no anonymity.9 3 In short, the court
emphasized Jardines's privacy expectation in his home over the dog
sniff's supposedly sui generis nature-indeed, according to the court,
the privacy expectation in the home negated the dog sniff's sui generis
nature-and over the illegitimate expectation of privacy in contraband.
Part III of this article shows how far afield of binding precedent the
Jardines court went (though its argument was still defensible). In other
words, the court's desire to preserve the sanctity of the home was so
powerful that not even United States Supreme Court precedent could
88. Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1183-84, 1190. Contra Timothy C. Stone, Comment, State v. Rabb:
Dog Sniffs Close to Home, 80 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1123, 1132-33 (2006) (arguing that Rabb was
wrong because a dog sniff is sui generis, and hence "unaffected by location").
89. Rabb, 920 So. 2d atl 190. Academic opinion agrees with the Rabb majority that the focus
should be on the expectation of privacy in the location sniffed, rather than on the expectation of
privacy in contraband. Lunney, supra note 54, at 832, 868; Jeffrey A. Bekiares, Comment,
Constitutional Law: Ratifying Suspicionless Canine Sniffs: Dog Days on the Highways, 57 FLA. L.
REv. 963, 972 (2005); Swanson, supra note 54, at 150; Tarlow, supra note 84, at 1128.
90. Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1196-97 (Gross, J., dissenting); accord Stabler, 990 So. 2d at
1260-61.
91. Jardines, 73 So. 3d at 45.
92. Id. at 49.
93. Id. at 48. In its certiorari petition, Florida argued that this "'public spectacle' test" finds
no support in case law. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 24; accord Brief of Texas
et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 2, at 6. Jardines countered that the
Florida Supreme Court did not create a public spectacle test, but only applied United States
Supreme Court precedent that permits inquiry into the intrusiveness of official conduct to
determine whether it is a search. Respondent's Amended Brief in Opposition, supra note 14, at 13.
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stand in the way. Part IV argues that given this strong preservationist
5 impulse, the court could have and should have gone farther, extending
Fourth Amendment protection against warrantless dog sniffs to apart-
ments, rather than leaving Stabler in place.
III. PROTECTING THE SANCTITY OF THE HOME
Because of its zeal to protect the sanctity of the home, in Jardines
the Florida Supreme Court misapplied United States Supreme Court pre-
cedent. Consequently, the United States Supreme Court will probably
reverse Jardines. However, the Florida Supreme Court's decision was
still defensible because dog sniffs are not actually sui generis, and
because other United States Supreme Court precedents give special
prominence to the sanctity of the home.
A. The Jardines Court's Misapplication of Precedent
One of the Jardines dissent's main arguments was that the majority
incorrectly applied binding precedent: "[T]he United States Supreme
Court did not limit its reasoning regarding dogs [sic] sniffs to locations
or objects unrelated to the home." 94 The dissent's argument finds sup-
port in the precedents themselves.
In Place, the Supreme Court determined that a sniff by a well-
trained dog "is much less intrusive than a typical search" because it "dis-
closes only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item."9 5
The Court continued, "This limited disclosure also ensures that the
owner of the property is not subjected to the embarrassment and incon-
venience entailed in less discriminate and more intrusive investigative
methods."96 It is in this respect in which "the canine sniff is sui
generis.""
This passage refers only to the nature of the dog sniff itself. The
Court meant that a sniff by a well-trained dog is in and of itself less
intrusive than other methods, not that such a sniff is more or less intru-
sive depending on the circumstance in which it takes place. Moreover,
the Court said that the sniff reveals only contraband, without requiring
the opening of the thing in which it is stored." That is equally true of a
dog sniff of the exterior of a home-the dog does not need to enter the
home to determine if contraband is present. The Court never suggested
that the intrusiveness of a sniff depends on whether the public could see
94. Jardines, 73 So. 3d at 68 (Polston, J., dissenting).
95. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
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the sniff itself; much less did it set forth a "public spectacle"9 9 standard,
as the Jardines court did. In fact, Place was questioned and detained in
an airport (where, presumably, others could see him), and the dog snif-
fed Place's "luggage, which was located in a public place."' 00 Most
courts that have considered the question also have interpreted Place to
apply to dog sniffs in general, regardless of the location sniffed.10
Although some courts' 02 rely on Kyllo to argue that a dog sniff of a
home is a search, others realize that Kyllo did not create an exception to
Place. For example, in Fitzgerald, the Maryland Court of Appeals inter-
preted Kyllo as applying only to "advancing technology," not to dogs,
which are not a technology at all,103 and, unlike thermal imagers, do not
reveal "intimate private details," only the presence of contraband.'"
Kyllo's inapplicability to dog sniffs becomes clearer upon examin-
ing Caballes,os in which the Supreme Court described its conclusion
that the dog sniff did not violate the Constitution as "entirely consistent
with" Kyllo.10 6 The crucial distinction was not that the dog sniff in
Caballes was of a car rather than a home, but that the thermal imager in
Kyllo could detect "lawful activity," whereas a dog sniff "reveals no
information other than the location of a substance that no individual has
any right to possess."' 7 In other words, the Court focused on the nature
of the dog sniff, not on the privacy expectation in the location where the
sniff occurred. Under current Supreme Court precedent, a dog sniff is
not a search, whether the thing sniffed is a house, a car, or anything else.
The justices had considered the issue of dog sniffs conducted at
99. Jardines, 73 So. 3d at 48.
100. Place, 462 U.S. at 698-99, 707.
101. United States v. Byle, No. 8:10-CR-419-T-30TGW, 2011 WL 1983355, at *4 (M.D. Fla.
May 20, 2011) (criticizing Jardines because "the Supreme Court meant what it said-a dog sniff
is not a search"); Fitzgerald v. State, 864 A.2d 1006, 1010 (Md. 2004) (arguing that the Supreme
Court has "adopted the ... view" that Place is not "narrowly directed at airplane luggage," but
rather "a general categorization of canine sniffs as non-searches"); State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d
173, 188 (Minn. 2007) ("[Tlhe Court's observations about dog sniffs in Place were predicated on
the Court's view that a dog sniff is not a search at all .
102. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
103. Fitzgerald, 864 A.2d at 1015-16 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Stone, supra
note 88, at 1134-35.
104. Fitzgerald, 864 A.2d at 1016. Interestingly and revealingly, a pre-Kyllo case holding that
thermal imaging is a search likewise distinguished thermal imaging from dog sniffs, on the ground
that dogs "alert only to contraband," whereas "the thermal imager picks up information of lawful
activities as well as unlawful." United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1519, 1533 (W.D. Wis.
1994).
105. See United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d 1009, 1016 (8th Cir. 2010) ("We reject Scott's
argument that this court should extend the holding in Kyllo v. United States to encompass dog
sniffs. Indeed, the Supreme Court rejected such an interpretation of Kyllo in Caballes." (citation
omitted)).
106. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005).
107. Id. at 409-10.
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homes during oral argument for Caballes. Justice Scalia-the author of
Kyllo-said that he was "not at all sure" that the Court would have
decided Kyllo as it did if the thermal imager could not discern "any of
the other private activities in the home," but only "a dead body with a
knife through the heart."t0 Again, after counsel for the petitioner
referred to "the tension between Kyllo and Place," Justice Scalia jumped
in:
[W]asn't what ... the Court was worried about in Kyllo not just the
relatively crude heat imaging that existed in the case before it, but the
prospect of more and more sophisticated heat imaging which . . . we
had evidence was already in development that would enable you to
see people moving around a room? I thought the case referred to that.
Now, are we going to have more and more-what's going to happen
with dogs? I . . . can't imagine that . .. this thing is going anywhere
other than smelling narcotics and smelling bombs.1 09
In other words, dogs were not the sort of "technology" that Kyllo
contemplated.
Taking into account Place and Caballes, and the policy considera-
tions regarding advancing technology underlying Kyllo, the soundest
conclusion is that in Jardines the Florida Supreme Court incorrectly
applied precedent. Therefore, if the United States Supreme Court fol-
lows its precedent, it will most likely reverse the Florida Supreme Court.
That is not to say, however, that Jardines is indefensible. On the con-
trary, the Florida Supreme Court had powerful and justifiable motives
for deciding as it did.
B. Justifications for Jardines
1. DOG SNIFFs ARE NOT Sui GENERIS
The first point in Jardines's favor is that the United States Supreme
Court's dog sniff jurisprudence is severely flawed. Although that does
not by itself justify going against precedent, it does present a satisfactory
reason for the United States Supreme Court to reexamine its prior deci-
sions. With Jardines, the Florida Supreme Court has given it an opportu-
nity to do so.
Frankly, dog sniffs are not sui generis. As Justice Souter, dissenting
in Caballes, pointed out, "The infallible dog . . . is a creature of legal
108. Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (No. 03-923),
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/03-923.pdf.
Justice Scalia also speculated that the Court could hold that a dog sniff is a search, with the sniff's
location as a factor in determining whether it was reasonable. Nevertheless, the Court did not
adopt this approach in its Caballes opinion. Id. at 22, 24.
109. Id. at 14.
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fiction."Io Justice Souter proceeded to list the accuracy rates of certain
dogs, citing a study "show[ing] that dogs in artificial testing situations
return false positives anywhere from 12.5% to 60% of the time, depend-
ing on the length of the search.""' A false positive will lead to a search
of the place or thing sniffed, risking the disclosure of "'intimate details'
without revealing contraband"-just like the thermal imager in Kyllo.112
"[T]he dog's fallibility" prevents it from revealing only contraband,
thereby "end[ing] the justification claimed in Place for treating the sniff
as sui generis." 13
High false alert rates can result from the dogs' inherent unreliabil-
ity." 4 Some dogs lack the temperament necessary to be "a working
dog," while others are "distractible or suggestible.""' Furthermore, dogs
often alert to noncontraband because they smell certain items associated
with contraband, like plastic bags or air freshener," 6 or because they
recognize a contaminant commonly associated with a drug, or smell a
drug's byproduct, which is not itself contraband.' For example, it is
possible that dogs alert not to cocaine itself, but to the cocaine byproduct
methyl benzoate, which is also found in perfumes and insecticides."1
Similarly, dogs sniffing for heroin alert to acetic acid, "a common sub-
stance used in pickles and certain glues."" 9 And a dog might not be able
to distinguish marijuana or hashish "from legal objects which have the
110. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 411 (Souter, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 412 (Souter, J., dissenting); accord Harris v. State, 71 So. 3d 756, 772 n.12 (Fla.
2011) (citing cases, including one in which the dog's accuracy rate was as low as fifty-five
percent).
112. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 413 (Souter, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 412 (Souter, J., dissenting)
114. Lewis R. Katz & Aaron P. Golembiewski, Curbing the Dog: Extending the Protection of
the Fourth Amendment to Police Drug Dogs, 85 NEB. L. REV. 735, 737, 739 (2007) (arguing that
Place is flawed, and should be overturned); Richard E. Myers II, Detector Dogs and Probable
Cause, 14 GEO. MASON L. REv. 1, 20-21 (2006) (describing a dog who "had flunked dog school
twice," and had a "less than fifty percent hit rate"); Richard E. Myers II, In the Wake ofCaballes,
Should We Let Sniffing Dogs Lie?, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2006, at 4, 6 ("[Slome dogs are
unreliable."); Bekiares, supra note 89, at 971; Swanson, supra note 54, at 153-55; Tarlow, supra
note 84, at 1124-27; see also Robert C. Bird, An Examination of the Training and Reliability of
the Narcotics Detection Dog, 85 Ky. L.J. 405, 432 (1996-1997) (conceding that "dog sniffs often
fail," but arguing that false positives "can be minimized" by ensuring that the dog is reliable, and
by refraining from random sniffs); Andrew E. Taslitz, Does the Cold Nose Know? The
Unscientific Myth of the Dog Scent Lineup, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 15, 41, 133 (1990) (debunking "the
dog's mythic infallibility," and arguing that dog scent lineups should be inadmissible in criminal
trials).
115. Myers, Detector Dogs, supra note 114, at 4.
116. Id.
117. Lunney, supra note 54, at 837-39.
118. Id. at 838-39; accord Katz & Golembiewski, supra note 114, at 755.
119. Katz & Golembiewski, supra note 114, at 755.
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same odors, such as hemp products, and fir and juniper trees."120
Another source of error is the dog handler. Handlers can cue the
dog that contraband is present, either subconsciously or consciously. 21
The handler can send signals to the dog-either purposely or acciden-
tally-by his actions, such as by "causing [the dog] to linger over an
area for a longer period of time," or "holding his breath a little longer
when he believes drugs may be present, shifting his weight, or slightly
altering his commands."l 22 A handler might also misinterpret the dog's
behavior, so that he thinks the dog is alerting when it really is not.' 2 3
A false positive can result even if the dog accurately identifies the
smell of a drug. Sometimes the residue left by a drug triggers an alert,
even though the drug is not there.' 2 4 For example, in Harris v. State, a
dog sniff of Harris's car revealed evidence of methamphetamine produc-
tion.125 Two months later, the same dog (Aldo) sniffed Harris's car
again, and "alerted to the same driver's side door handle." 26 This time,
however, no contraband was in the car.127 Aldo's policeman-handler tes-
tified that Aldo could sense "residual odors," which might exist simply
because someone who had the odor on his hand touched the door
handle.'2 "
Dogs' sensitivity to residual odors shows that even reliable dogs
can falsely alert. If the authorities conduct dog sniffs indiscriminately
(as Justices Souterl 29 and Ginsburg' 30 have feared), then even a dog with
a low false positive rate would produce a greater number of false posi-
tives than accurate sniffs. For example, if a dog with an accuracy rate as
high as ninety percent sniffs one hundred people, only one of whom has
contraband, the dog might alert to that one person, but might also falsely
alert to ten innocent people, searches of whom would reveal only non-
contraband."' If the police were to conduct dog sniffs only on reasona-
ble suspicion, then the proportion of innocent to guilty people searched
would likely shift. 32 Nevertheless, the many opportunities for error-
120. Id. at 756.
121. Myers, Detector Dogs, supra note 114, at 5, 22-24.
122. Katz & Golembiewski, supra note 114, at 763.
123. Id. at 762; Taslitz, supra note 114, at 83.
124. Myers, Detector Dogs, supra note 114, at 4-5.
125. Harris v. State, 71 So. 3d 756, 760 (Fla. 2011).
126. Id. at 761.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 411 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 422 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
131. Katz & Golembiewski, supra note 114, at 758; accord Bird, supra note 114, at 427-29;
Myers, Detector Dogs, supra note 114, at 13-15.
132. Bird, supra note 114, at 430; Myers, Detector Dogs, supra note 114, at 17.
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from residual odor detection to handler cuing-demonstrate that even
the most reliable dogs are not sui generis.
2. PRIORITIZING THE PROTECTION OF THE HOME
That a home could be searched, and its intimate details exposed,
based on nothing more than an alert that stood a good chance of being
wrong would be especially disconcerting to a court that prioritized pro-
tecting the sanctity of the home. The Florida Supreme Court is such a
court.
In Jardines, the Florida Supreme Court emphasized "the sanctity of
the citizen's home," and the potency of the expectation of privacy
attached to it.' 33 The court noted that United States Supreme Court pre-
cedent mandates that a search must be based on probable cause-"[a]nd
that precedent . . . applies with extra force where the sanctity of the
home is concerned."' The sniff at issue intruded "into the sanctity of
the home."l 35
The Florida Supreme Court was correct that United States Supreme
Court precedent gives a special place to the home. For example, Kyllo
referred to the home as "a constitutionally protected area" 136-a sacred
place to be protected more fervently than, for instance, an industrial
complex.' 3 "[P]rivacy expectations are most heightened" in the
home. 138 The United States Supreme Court continued, "In the home, our
cases show, all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held
safe from prying government eyes."' 3 In light of pronouncements like
these, the Florida Supreme Court justifiably could conclude that a dog
sniff conducted at a home should receive greater constitutional scrutiny
than a dog sniff of luggage or a car.
There is also a common-sense argument in favor of the Florida
Supreme Court's position: When the police conduct a dog sniff, they are
searching for drugs. As the dissent in Fitzgerald argued, a dog sniff is a
search because it is "an investigative technique" used "to detect the pres-
ence of drugs." 4 0 The dissent continued, "The canine sniff at the door of
Fitzgerald's apartment was not a detection of something in the hallway,
but rather was a detection of something inside Fitzgerald's apartment-a
133. Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34, 45 (Fla. 2011).
134. Id. at 36-37.
135. Id. at 36, 56.
136. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
137. Id. at 37.
138. Id. at 33 (internal quotation marks omitted).
139. Id.




In the face of the precedents set by Place, Jacobsen, and Caballes,
this probably is the losing argument, but it is the argument more compat-
ible with this country's traditions and values.' 42 Once the Florida
Supreme Court made a point of preserving those traditions and values
against the intrusion presented by warrantless dog sniffs, it should have
been consistent and extended the same protection to apartments.
IV. EXTENDING JARDINES'S PROTECTION TO APARTMENTS
When Jardines comes before it, the United States Supreme Court
should extend to apartments the protection that Jardines established for
houses. As homes, apartments generate expectations of privacy similar
to those of houses. If houses are sacred enough to be protected from
warrantless dog sniffs, so are apartments. A failure to protect apartments
from warrantless dog sniffs will adversely affect a substantial segment
of the citizenry, considering that many-perhaps most-people will live
in apartments at some point in their lives, especially in this era of eco-
nomic depression, in which financial exigency might oblige more people
than in previous years to move into apartments.
A. Houses and Apartments Generate Similar Expectations of Privacy
Apartments and similar dwellings are homes, too, as the United
States Supreme Court has recognized.14 3 Concurring in McDonald, Jus-
tice Jackson identified "quarters in a tenement" as "private homes."' 4 4 In
Miller, the Court equated an apartment with a house, and its tenant with
a "householder.""' And in Stoner, the Court asserted, "No less than a
tenant of a house, or the occupant of a room in a boarding house, a guest
in a hotel room is entitled to constitutional protection against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures."l 46
Much later, in Thomas, which involved a warrantless dog sniff con-
141. Id. (Greene, J., dissenting).
142. See Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34, 56 (Fla. 2011) (Lewis, J., specially concurring)
(arguing that the Fourth Amendment expresses "[t]he importance of freedom and liberty upon
which this nation was founded," and "reflects who we are as a people and reflects our values that
protect every citizen from unreasonable intrusions by the government").
143. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 484 (1964) (hotel room); Miller v. United States, 357
U.S. 301, 302 (1958) (apartment); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 452 (1948) (room in
rooming house).
144. McDonald, 335 U.S. at 459 (Jackson, J., concurring).
145. Miller, 357 U.S. at 313 ("Every householder, the good and the bad, the guilty and the
innocent, is entitled to the protection designed to secure the common interest against unlawful
invasion of the house." (emphasis added)).
146. Stoner, 376 U.S. at 490 (emphasis added).
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ducted at an apartment door,' 47 the Second Circuit held that the sniff
was an unconstitutional search of a "dwelling," in which the defendant
had a "heightened expectation of privacy."'" The Second Circuit was
correct in attributing to dwellings the same heightened expectation of
privacy. An apartment is just a type of home, as is a house; there is no
meaningful distinction between houses and apartments that justified the
Florida Supreme Court in treating one type of home as sacred, while
deeming the other unworthy of the same status and protection.
Courts often note that the police have a right to be in common
hallways in front of apartments; they reason that "a tenant has no reason-
able expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment build-
ing" because anyone else can use that space.'49 But the hallway in front
of an apartment is similar to the walkway leading up to a house. One
Maryland court even argued that the police could conduct a dog sniff
from the hallway in front of an apartment because such a hallway is as
accessible to the public as a sidewalk or walkway outside a house. 50
Indeed, other courts have upheld warrantless dog sniffs conducted at
front doors of houses on the ground that the police could access the area
like anyone else, so that the area did not generate a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy.' 5 ' The Jardines court itself acknowledged that the police
may lawfully walk up to a citizen's front door because of the area's
reduced privacy expectation.' 52
However, the fact that the police conducted the sniff from the pub-
licly accessible area at Jardines's front door had no bearing on the Flor-
ida Supreme Court's decision. The court focused not on the
reasonableness of the privacy expectation in the place from which the
police conducted the sniff, but rather on the reasonableness of the pri-
147. United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1366 (2d Cir. 1985).
148. Id. at 1366, 1367 (emphasis added).
149. United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir. 1991); accord United States
v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1242 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Holland, 755 F.2d 253. 256 (2d Cir.
1985). Contra United States v. Roby, 122 F.3d 1120, 1126 (8th Cir. 1997) (Heaney, J., dissenting)
("While the corridor of a hotel is shared by guests and personnel alike, it is not a public area akin
to an airport or a commercial bus. Neither guests nor the hotel personnel expect to have police
officers, much less large German Shepherds, patrolling the hotel hallways.").
150. Fitzgerald v. State, 837 A.2d 989, 1024 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003).
151. Hoop v. State, 909 N.E.2d 463, 468 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) ("Detective Krider could
lawfully approach Hoop's front door using the walkway that would ordinarily be used by any
visitor, and the sniff did not implicate the Fourth Amendment."); Rodriguez v. State, 106 S.W.3d
224, 228 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003) ("We hold that appellant did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy outside his home where the drug-dog sniffed because the front door area was not
enclosed, it was used as the main entrance to the house, and it was not protected from observation
by passersby."). But see Lunney, supra note 54, at 852 (criticizing courts for permitting dog sniffs
outside homes if conducted from publicly accessible areas because Place and Caballes "did not
turn on the lawfulness of the location of the officer's feet (or the dog's paws)").
152. Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34, 46 (Fla. 2011).
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vacy expectation in the place that was the target of the sniff-the sacred
home. 15
Because the real issue to the Florida Supreme Court was not
whether the police were lawfully present, but whether the home carries a
heightened expectation of privacy, it does not matter if the home is a
stand-alone structure or an apartment in a multi-unit building. As a
home, an apartment is protected even if the hallway outside it is notl 54 -
just like a house is protected even if the walkway approaching it is not.
Contrary to the Florida Supreme Court's attempt to distinguish Sta-
bler,15 1 on the court's own terms there is no meaningful distinction
between a dog sniff targeting an apartment and a dog sniff targeting a
house. One of the court's main concerns was the intrusion effected by
the "public spectacle" of the dog sniff, which deprives the citizen of
anonymity, and subjects him to "public opprobrium, humiliation and
embarrassment." 5 6
Such a spectacle could materialize just as easily in the hallway of
an apartment building as in the middle of a residential neighborhood.
Just like residents of houses, apartment tenants have neighbors who will
be aware of the investigation, and perhaps interpret it as an accusation of
criminal wrongdoing.'I" The tenant could experience the same fear and
anxiety that the Florida Supreme Court worried the resident of a house
might experience.'" His humiliation would be no less potent. In fact, the
close proximity between apartments might even make the risk of neigh-
bor awareness and observation greater than would be the case with a dog
sniff targeting a house. Regardless, because apartments and houses are
just different types of homes, they harbor similarly powerful and reason-
able expectations of privacy, so that a warrantless dog sniff of one is just
as intrusive as a warrantless dog sniff of the other.
Once one realizes that the correct analogy is not between an apart-
ment building and a house, but instead between an apartment and a
house (with the hallway outside the apartment serving as the counterpart
to the path leading up to the house), then for Fourth Amendment pur-
poses it does not matter whether the sharing of the apartment building's
153. Id. at 45.
154. E.g., Fitzgerald v. State, 837 A.2d 989, 1026 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003) ("[T]he outer
boundary of the protected area was the property line of the apartment itself. Beyond that line, the
vestibule of the apartment house was no different than a public street or an open field.").
155. Jardines, 73 So. 3d at 39 n.3.
156. Id. at 48.
157. See id. ("[S]uch dramatic government activity in the eyes of many-neighbors, passers-
by, and the public at large-will be viewed as an official accusation of crime.").
158. Id. at 49 ("And if the resident happens to be present at the time of the 'sniff test,' such an
intrusion into the sanctity of his or her home will generally be a frightening and harrowing
experience that could prompt a reflexive or unpredictable response.").
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common areas vitiates the expectation of privacy in those areas,' 5 9 or
whether any individual tenant has "the right to exclude others from" the
building.16 o
In dog sniff cases, focusing on the privacy expectation in the build-
ing would produce inconsistent results. Some buildings might have
greater privacy expectations than others, depending on whether the
building has security, whether it is locked or requires visitors to be buz-
zed in, and other factors.161 Focusing instead on the fact that the apart-
ment is a home that harbors a heightened expectation of privacy not only
better comports with this country's traditions and with common sense; it
also provides a more workable standard.
B. Negative Consequences of Retaining Different Rules
for Houses and Apartments
Difficulties in application might not be the only problem caused by
retaining different rules for dog sniffs of houses and apartments. By
excluding apartments from protection against warrantless dog sniffs, the
Florida Supreme Court left nearly two million Floridian homes 62 VUl-
159. See United States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814, 816 (8th'Cir. 1977); Trevor Allen, Note, State
v. Guillen: Home Privacy Protection Disappearing in the Desert, 51 ARIz. L. REv. 1097, 1105,
1107 (2009).
160. See Allen, supra note 159, at 1107; see also United States v. Anderson, 154 F.3d 1225,
1232 n.3 (10th Cir. 1998) (determining that the apartment cases did not apply when the issue was
entry into a room in an office building because Anderson "had the authority to exclude others
from" the room, whereas "a tenant does not have the authority to exclude others from a common
hallway"). Contra Leonetti, supra note 27, at 317 (referring to the right to exclude from "an
apartment building, condominium complex, or hotel" as a "collective right"); Lewis, supra note
64, at 288 ("The fact that tenants do not have an absolute right to exclude all others from the
locked common areas of their buildings should not obliterate their constitutional interests in these
areas.").
161. See United States v. Holland, 755 F.2d 253, 259 (2d Cir. 1985) (Newman, J., dissenting)
("I believe a tenant has a legitimate expectation of privacy in a hallway when he is using it to
admit someone to his home; at least, this should be so in a small two-family house like
Holland's."); United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545, 551, 552 (6th Cir. 1976) (noting, in a case
involving a locked building, that "[a] tenant expects other tenants and invited guests to enter in the
common areas of the building, but he does not [expect] trespassers"); State v. Ortiz, 600 N.W.2d
805, 819 (Neb. 1999) (stating that an apartment building hallway is a private, not public, area; and
listing factors to determine "the degree of privacy," including "whether there is an outer door
locked to the street . . .; the number of residents using the hallway; the number of units in the
apartment complex; and the presence or absence of no trespassing signage" (citations omitted)).
162. According to Census Bureau data, in 2010, Florida had 7,035,068 homes, twenty-six
percent-or 1,829,118-of which were in structures with at least two apartment units. Table
S2504: Physical Housing Characteristics for Occupied Housing Units: 2010 American
Community Survey 1-Year Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/
tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_10_1YRS2504&prodType=table (last
visited Mar. 20, 2012). To access the data for Florida, click "Back to Search"; click on the
"Geographies" tab; add Florida; type "S2504" in the search box; click "Go"; and select the data
set for "I-year estimates."
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nerable to the very practice that it sought to curtail.
Some judges have raised the possibility that a lack of protection for
apartments and similar dwellings could disproportionately affect the
poorest citizens in the society. For instance, in United States v. Roby,
one judge dissented from the majority's upholding of a dog sniff at a
motel room door,' 63 writing, "I do not believe that the Fourth Amend-
ment protects only those persons who can afford to live in a single-
family residence with no surrounding common space. " ' Another judge
(dissenting in a Maryland case upholding a warrantless dog sniff con-
ducted at an apartment door)165 predicted "that those who reside in
apartment buildings with gated or secured entrances will be afforded
greater protections under the law than those who reside in apartment
buildings that are left unsecured or open to the public"; 166 in conse-
quence, the police would target poor and minority neighborhoods. 6 ' To
avoid the "Orwellian" "specter of the police roaming indiscriminately
through the corridors of public housing projects with trained dogs in
search of drugs," the New York Court of Appeals held that a dog sniff of
a residence is a search requiring reasonable suspicion.'68
Scholars have also expressed concern that "Fourth Amendment law
. . . may make poorer suspects worse off."l 69 One speculated that this
occurs because "[p]rivacy . . . exists only in" places occupied by the
well-off, like houses, but not in places occupied by the poor, like apart-
163. United States v. Roby, 122 F.3d 1120, 1125 (8th Cir. 1997).
164. Id. at 1127 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
165. Fitzgerald v. State, 864 A.2d 1006, 1007 (Md. 2004).
166. Id. at 1023 (Greene, J., dissenting); accord Lindsay Victoria Ruth Moss, Recent
Development, Fitzgerald v. State: A Drug-Dog Sniff of Exterior Portions of a Residence Does Not
Constitute a Search Under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, 35 U. BALT. L.F. 155,
158 (2005); see also United States v. Holland, 755 F.2d 253, 257 (2d Cir. 1985) (Newman, J.,
dissenting) ("I do not believe the Fourth Amendment protection available to those admitting
visitors to their apartment homes in a modem building is lost in the humble surroundings in which
Mose Holland lives."). But see United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1240 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding that Nohara did not have "a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hallway outside his
apartment in his high security, high rise apartment building").
167. Fitzgerald, 864 A.2d at 1023, 1026 (Greene, J., dissenting).
168. People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 1058 (N.Y. 1990); accord Hoop v. State, 909 N.E.2d
463, 470 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (requiring reasonable suspicion for a dog sniff of a residence, to
"restrict arbitrary selection of persons to be searched"); Lunney, supra note 54, at 831 ("Without a
warrant requirement, or even a suspicion requirement, police are thereby granted unfettered
discretion to conduct dragnet investigations at housing projects or other multidwelling locations,
such as apartment complexes, or to arbitrarily select sniff locations."); see also Christopher M.
Pardo, Driving Off the Face of the Fourth Amendment: Weighing Caballes Under the Proposed
"Vehicular Frisk" Standard, 43 VAL. U. L. REv. 113, 120, 146 (2008) (arguing that Caballes
would lead to discriminatory dog sniffs targeting the poor and minorities).
169. William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 1265, 1266 (1999).
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ments.'o Furthermore, according to this scholar, Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence has focused on the most intrusive practices, which happen
to be those used to ferret out crimes by the wealthy; in consequence, the
police divert resources to "uncovering the crimes of the poor."' 7 ' For
example, "in well-off neighborhoods, [drug] transactions are likely to
take place in private dwellings . . .; in poorer neighborhoods, transac-
tions take place on the street. Fourth Amendment law makes it much
harder to police the former, and thereby pushes police to focus ever
more on the latter."' 72 There is thus a disparity in enforcement, despite
the tendency of drug use to "cut across social class and ethnic affilia-
tion."l73 Another scholar has argued for "an expansion of the definition
of curtilage" to include the areas outside apartments and similar dwell-
ings, to combat the use of dog sniffs and other "investigatory techniques
in urban areas and among multi-occupant dwellings."' 74
But the problem is actually greater than these judges and scholars
realize. Although poor people are more likely to live in apartments than
people with higher incomes,"' income statistics to a large extent reflect
mere differences in earning power between young adults and the middle-
aged, with the young earning considerably less because they have yet to
accumulate the experience, raises, benefits, and promotions possessed
by older income-earners.617  Therefore, at some point in their lives,
170. Id. at 1266, 1274.
171. Id. at 1267.
172. Id. at 1274.
173. Id. at 1281. Stuntz continued, "Though illegal drug use is much more common in some
communities than others, it nevertheless is fairly common in communities of all sorts." Id. The
data support this view. According to one study, "21 percent [of welfare recipients] had used an
illegal drug in the past," compared to thirteen percent of non-welfare recipients. Rukmalie
Jayakody, Sheldon Danziger, Kristin Seefeldt, & Harold Pollack, Substance Abuse and Welfare
Reform, NPC POLICY BRIEF (Nat'l Poverty Ctr.), Apr. 2004, at 1, 2, available at http://www.npc.
umich.edu/publications/policy-briefs/brief02/brief2.pdf. Also, "33 percent of youths in families
with incomes of less than $20,000 reported lifetime use of any illicit drug compared with 27
percent of youths in families with incomes of $75,000 or more." Youth Substance Use and Family
Income, NSDUH REPORT, (Office of Applied Studies, Substance Abuse & Mental Health Servs.
Admin.), Dec. 24, 2004, at 1, 2, available at http://oas.samhsa.gov/2k4/youthlncome/youth
Income.pdf.
174. Leonetti, supra note 27, at 298, 311.
175. Nationwide, in 2010, twenty-five percent of occupied housing units were in structures
with at least two apartment units. Table S2504: Physical Housing Characteristics for Occupied
Housing Units: 2010 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http:/
/factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtmlpid=ACS_10 1YRS25
04&prodType=table (last visited Mar. 20, 2012). Meanwhile, forty-one percent of poor
households live in apartments. Robert Rector & Rachel Sheffield, Understanding Poverty in the
United States: Surprising Facts About America's Poor, BACKGROUNDER (Heritage Found.), Sept.
13, 2011, at 1, 11, available at http://thf-media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/bg2607.pdf.
176. THOMAS SOWELL, ECONOMIC FACTS AND FALLACIES 136, 138 (2008); THOMAS SOWELL,




many-perhaps most-people will live in apartments, and will thus
have lesser Fourth Amendment protection from intrusions into their
homes.
Moreover, because people with lower incomes are more likely to
live in cheaper housing (like apartments), many people's Fourth Amend-
ment rights will ebb and flow according to the vicissitudes of the econ-
omy. During a recession, their Fourth Amendment rights could wither.
Between 2001 and 2008, the national unemployment rate was never
higher than 7.3 percent; but beginning in 2009, it has not fallen below
7.8 percent.' 7 7 Median household income has fallen for three years in a
row.' 7 1 Meanwhile, from 2009 to 2010, the poverty rate increased from
14.3 percent to 15.1 percent,17 9 with the largest increases in Nevada and
Florida-two of the states hardest hit by the burst housing bubble.so In
2010, there were a "record 2.9 million foreclosures"; "Florida had the
third highest foreclosure rate.""' It seems likely that the percentage of
Americans-especially Floridians-living in apartments will increase in
the near future.
The Florida Supreme Court justifiably aspired to protect Floridians
from the intrusion into their privacy threatened by warrantless dog
sniffs. But the court forgot about the Fourth Amendment rights of apart-
ment dwellers, a demographic that, at any given time, numbers in the
millions, and to which many more-perhaps most-people belong at
some point in their lives. The court left its task incomplete. The United
States Supreme Court should adopt and complete that task by extending
to apartments the protection that Jardines offers only to houses.
V. CONCLUSION
Jardines presented the Florida Supreme Court with an opportunity
to rein in the practice of warrantless dog sniffs of the exteriors of homes.
To reassert the citizens' Fourth Amendment rights, the court had to con-
front overwhelming precedent that deems dog sniffs to be non-searches,
on the ground that dog sniffs are sui generis in that they reveal only
177. Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/Insl4000000 (last visited Mar. 20, 2012).
178. Conor Dougherty, Income Slides to 1996 Levels, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 14, 2011), http://on
line.wsj.comL/article/SB 10001424053111904265504576568543968213896.html.
179. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT, BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR, & JESSICA C. SMITH, INCOME,
POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2010 15 (2011), available
at http://www.census.gov/prod/201 1pubs/p60-239.pdf.
1 80. Lisa Lambert, Recession Drove up Poverty Rates in Most States, REUTERS (Sept. 26,
2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/26/us-usa-states-poverty-idUSTRE78P5BE201109
26.
181. Susanna Kim, 2010 Had Record 2.9 Million Foreclosures, ABC NEWS (Jan. 13, 2011),
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/201 0-record-29-million-foreclosures/story?id= 12602271.
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contraband, which harbors no reasonable expectation of privacy. In
holding that a dog sniff of the exterior of a house requires probable
cause and a warrant, the court also found itself at odds with courts in a
majority of jurisdictions. To sidestep United States Supreme Court pre-
cedent that a dog sniff is not a search, the Florida Supreme Court argued
that a dog sniff of a home is not sui generis because it exposes the
homeowner to a humiliating public spectacle. This standard finds no
support in precedent.
Yet the Florida Supreme Court's argument is still defensible
because a dog sniff is not in fact sui generis. Dogs themselves are falli-
ble, and several other factors like residual odor detection and handler
cuing can make them even less accurate. Moreover, the court had the
advantage of vindicating the sanctity of the home-a powerful and time-
honored ideal that continues to influence American jurisprudence
through cases like Kyllo.
Nevertheless, the Florida Supreme Court left its task of preserving
the home's sanctity incomplete. Once the court determined on that path,
it should have extended Fourth Amendment protection against warrant-
less dog sniffs to apartments and similar dwellings, instead of reserving
it to houses. Apartments are homes, too. Although apartments open onto
common areas like hallways, these areas are merely analogous to
houses' front porches and walkways. As the low privacy expectations
attached to the latter areas did not prevent the court from holding that
the heightened privacy expectation in the house itself protected it from
warrantless dog sniffs, so too should the court have held that an apart-
ment-home's similarly heightened expectation of privacy shielded it
from these intrusions. The court's failure to include apartments within
its Jardines holding leaves millions of citizens unprotected from the
very practice that it sought to curtail.
Accordingly, when the United States Supreme Court hears Florida
v. Jardines, it should confer Fourth Amendment protection from war-
rantless dog sniffs not just to people who live in houses, but to people
who live in apartments as well.
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